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Abstract
Financial market expectations regarding future policy actions by the Bank of Canada are an
important input into the Bank’s decision-making process, and they can be measured using a
variety of sources. The author develops a simple expectations-based model to focus on measuring
interest rate expectations that are implied by the current level of money market yields. The
explanatory power of this model increases markedly in the period following the implementation
of the Bank’s regime of ﬁxed announcement dates in November 2000, and it appears to accurately
describe the behaviour of short-term yields. Term premiums are estimated for the various
instruments examined, and observed market yields are adjusted by those amounts. Once the
market yields are adjusted, they can be used to calculate implied forward rates for a series of dates
in the future. These forward rates can be interpreted as representing the market’s expectations for
the future level of overnight rates at a speciﬁc date.
JEL classiﬁcation: G1
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Interest rates
Résumé
Les attentes des marchés ﬁnanciers concernant les décisions futures de la Banque du Canada en
matière de politique monétaire occupent une place importante dans le processus décisionnel de
l’institution, et on peut les mesurer à l’aide de diverses sources. L’auteur élabore un modèle
simple pour mesurer spéciﬁquement les attentes de taux d’intérêt implicites dans les rendements
courants du marché monétaire. Le modèle voit son pouvoir explicatif s’accroître sensiblement
dans la période qui a suivi la mise en œuvre, en novembre 2000, du système de dates d’annonce
préétablies et il semble décrire avec précision le comportement des rendements à court terme.
L’auteur évalue les primes à terme pour les divers instruments examinés, puis corrige en
conséquence les rendements observés. Une fois corrigés, les rendements du marché peuvent
servir à calculer les taux à terme implicites pour une série de dates à venir. On peut considérer ces
taux à terme comme représentatifs des attentes des marchés concernant le niveau auquel le taux
du ﬁnancement à un jour se situera à une date précise.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G1
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Taux d’intérêt1
1. Introduction
The measurement of ﬁnancial market expectations regarding future changes in the overnight rate
is an important input into the Bank of Canada’s decision-making process for setting the target for
the overnight rate. The Bank of Canada adjusts this target in an attempt to inﬂuence the inﬂation
rate. The linkage between the overnight rate and the inﬂation rate consists of three key steps: the
ﬁrst is between the overnight rate and other ﬁnancial variables (longer-term interest rates and the
exchange rate), the second is from these ﬁnancial variables to aggregate demand, and the third is
from aggregate demand to the output gap. The ﬁnancial markets are the mechanism through
which the ﬁrst step is realized and through which changes in the overnight rate are transmitted
into the other ﬁnancial variables. It is important, therefore, to be able to properly assess the impact
that contemplated policy decisions may have on market-determined interest rates, because these
interest rates feed into the real economy. To this end, policy-makers need to be aware of which
decisions would constitute a surprise and which are well anticipated. An accurate measure of the
market’s opinion on the direction and magnitude of future rate changes can therefore help policy-
makers assess the full potential impact of any contemplated rate decisions and give them a frame
of reference that may inﬂuence how policy decisions are communicated.
Interest rate expectations embedded in securities prices also provide valuable information about
how market participants view the economy. The short-term maturity segment of Canada’s interest
rate market contains a large number of liquid instruments that allow participants to structure
positions based on their views of the expected future path of short rates. The observed market
yields of these instruments represent a sort of consensus estimate for this future path.1 This
consensus economic forecast can be compared and contrasted with the Bank’s internal economic
forecasts.
An accurate measure of the market’s expectations for future interest rate moves, therefore, has
two signiﬁcant beneﬁts. First, from a tactical perspective, knowing what interest rate path is
currently discounted in market prices will help policy-makers anticipate the near-term effect of a
speciﬁc interest rate decision on other, market-determined rates. Second, the market’s
1. This consensus estimate is,however, dollar weighted. Participants who place the largest amount of
money at risk have the largest inﬂuence on prices. Theseparticipants may be extremely conﬁdent of
their view, have very high levels of risk tolerance, or have a very large capital base. None of these
factors suggests, though, that their view is any more informed or accurate than that of others with less
risk capital. Thisdoes mean, however, that the perfect competition assumption common in many
economic models (many small participants, none of which have signiﬁcant pricing power) does not
hold in this case.2
expectations of future interest rate moves can serve as a type of consensus economic forecast.
This forecast can then be compared with those of the Bank and of other, external forecasters.
Financial market expectations regarding future changes in the overnight rate can be measured
using a variety of sources, including expectations implicit in the yields of money market
instruments, surveys of private sector forecasters, published reports from investment dealers, and
regular interaction with market participants. This paper describes one method by which the Bank
quantiﬁes the market’s expectations using observed yields on money market assets. The focus will
be on measuring expectations over a relatively short time horizon, speciﬁcally twelve months and
less.
The model described in this paper is based upon the expectations hypothesis (EH), which implies
that longer-term interest rates are rational estimators of future short-term interest rates. Section 2
describes the EH in detail, explaining the theory and providing a brief literature review. Section 3
reviews the various Canadian money market instruments that could be potential inputs into the
models and selects those that are most suitable. Sections 4 and 5 test the EH using the selected
money market assets over two distinct subperiods, and section 6 demonstrates the mechanics of
the actual model.
In November 2000, the Bank implemented a policy of ﬁxed announcement dates (FADs),
changing the way monetary policy was implemented. Prior to that date, the Bank could change
the overnight rate on any date. This meant that the market might be conﬁdent of the direction of
interest rate changes, but very uncertain as to the timing. This uncertainty could at times make it
difﬁcult to price short-term assets and may have reduced their predictive effectiveness. With the
implementation of the FAD policy, the Bank committed itself to consider changes to the overnight
rate on a series of eight pre-announced dates each year. Changes between FADs, while still
possible, would be made only under exceptional circumstances.2 The goal of this change was to
decrease uncertainty regarding the timing of the Bank’s policy changes. This change was also
expected to improve the focus on domestic circumstances, resulting in increased efﬁciency in the
pricing of short-term assets. By testing the EH in both the pre- and post-FAD periods, it is
possible to determine whether this has occurred.
2. InthepressreleasethatannouncedtheimplementationoftheFADs,itwasstatedthattheBankwould
retaintheoptionoftakingactionbetweenﬁxeddates,althoughitwouldexercisethisoptiononlyinthe
event of extraordinary circumstances. To date, only one change has been made between FADs: on 17
September 2001, the Bank lowered the overnight rate by 50 basis points following the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks.3
2. The Expectations Hypothesis
2.1 Deﬁnition
The EH is the best-known and most intuitive theory of the term structure of interest rates. It
maintains that forward rates (or spot rates, for securities with a longer term-to-maturity) are
rational estimates of future realized short rates plus a constant risk premium. This is equivalent to
stating that a longer-term (single period) interest rate should be equal to the geometric average of
expected future short-term rates plus a risk premium:
, (1)
where Rt is the one-period rate at time t,  is the information set at time t, Yt(r) is the r-period
term rate at time t, and  represents a constant risk premium that can be distinct across the
different maturities, r.
There are two versions of the EH. The ﬁrst, the pure EH, sets equal to zero and maintains that
investor expectations of future short-term interest rates are the sole determinant of long-term
rates. It assumes that market participants (in aggregate) are risk-neutral and that expected returns
across assets of different maturities are equal for any given investment horizon. The pure EH also
implies that forward rates represent unbiased estimators of future short rates, and that any excess
returns from forward rates are random errors and unforecastable.
The second version, the general EH, weakens the constraint on the pure EH slightly, allowing
to take on non-zero values. The shape of the yield curve in the general EH is inﬂuenced by three
factors: the market’s expectations for future short-term interest rates, a bond risk premium, and a
convexity bias. In this version,  amalgamates both the bond risk premium and the convexity
bias.
The bond risk premium represents a yield premium (or excess expected return) that an investor
requires to hold any instrument with a longer maturity or greater credit risk than the one-period
risk-free asset. This risk premium does not have to be positive and can vary across sections of the
yield curve. The liquidity-preference hypothesis holds that investors are risk-averse and dislike
short-term ﬂuctuations in asset prices. As a result, longer-term bonds require higher yields to
compensate for their increased price volatility. The preferred-habitat hypothesis maintains that the













risk premium is a function of supply and demand imbalances within speciﬁc maturity sectors, and
therefore may actually decrease with duration. Investors who typically hold long-duration
liabilities (such as life insurance companies and pension funds) may perceive longer-duration
assets as less risky. If the institution’s goal is to immunize its liabilities, it should be willing to pay
a premium for long-duration assets that accomplish this goal. In general, the term “risk premium”
is used to encompass all of these factors.
Convexity describes the curvature of the yield-to-maturity curve. All non-callable bonds have
positive convexity, which means that their prices increase more for a given decline in yields than
they fall for an equivalent rise in yields. Convexity is a desirable characteristic, since, all else
being equal, it leads to higher returns. Convexity can be considered a type of option, because it
has a larger value in markets where volatility is high. Investors are willing to pay for this, so bonds
with a large amount of convexity tend to trade at lower yields than bonds of similar duration that
are less convex. Long-maturity zero-coupon bonds (often having durations of over 25 years) have
very high levels of convexity. The result is the tendency for the very long end of the yield curve to
be ﬂat (or even inverted). Convexity is a much more signiﬁcant factor with long-maturity bonds;
its impact on assets that have less than one year to maturity is negligible.
A further variation of the EH maintains that the risk premium, , varies across time, or, stated
another way, . The evidence for a time-varying value of is particularly strong for
longer-maturity assets, and a number of empirical studies that reject the more strict deﬁnitions of
the EH allow that it could hold if the risk premiums were time-varying. Research in this area has
focused on identifying the economic variables that inﬂuence the size of the risk premiums and
attempting to model their behaviour going forward.
2.2 Empirical evidence
The EH has been the subject of an enormous amount of empirical work. The results have
generally been consistent in rejecting both the pure EH (rejection of the hypothesis that the risk
premium is zero) and the general EH (rejection of the hypothesis that the risk premium is a
constant). Schiller (1990) provides a general literature review of ten of the earlier studies and ﬁnds
that all reject the EH. Campbell (1995) also rejects the hypothesis and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross
(1981) argue that it contains mutually contradictory propositions and is incompatible with any
continuous-time, rational-expectations equilibrium model of the yield curve. These studies do,
however, consistently maintain that the EH could hold if the risk premiums were time-varying.3
3. Studies thatsuggest the EH would hold with time-varying risk premiums include Schiller, Campbell,
and Schoenholtz (1983), Fama and Bliss (1987), Froot (1989), and Schiller (1990).
ar
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Empirical tests of the EH using Canadian data are rare. Hejazi, Lai, and Yang (2000) reject the
hypothesis using Canadian treasury bill data based on the existence of time-varying risk
premiums. They then examine the determinants of these premiums, and ﬁnd that their size is
correlated with the size of the yield-curve spreads between different maturities, and sensitive to
the conditional variances of U.S. macroeconomic variables. Paquette and Stréliski (1998)
examine the EH in Canada using forward rate agreements and also ﬁnd evidence of time-varying
risk premiums.
Some recent studies, however, have emerged in defence of the EH, particularly at the short end of
the yield curve. Longstaff (2000a) provides a theoretical argument in which he maintains that if
ﬁxed-income markets are incomplete, then the EH cannot be ruled out on theoretical grounds, as
Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981) suggest. All traditional forms of the EH can be consistent with
the no-arbitrage condition. Longstaff (2000b) also ﬁnds some support for the EH in the very short
end of the yield curve. Speciﬁcally, he ﬁnds that, using overnight, weekly, and monthly repo rates,
the term rates are unbiased estimators of the average overnight rate realized over the period. The
risk premiums in the weekly and monthly rates are very small and not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. Durre, Snorre, and Pilegaard (2003) test the EH on daily rates in the euro area using forward
and spot rates in a cointegrated vector autoregression (VAR) model. They ﬁnd evidence that
supports the EH for maturities out to nine months. Cole and Reichenstein (1994) test whether
eurodollar futures provide an unbiased estimate of the U.S.-dollar London Inter-Bank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) at their expiration.4 They ﬁnd that the front eurodollar contract provides an
unbiased forecast of LIBOR at expiry, while more distant contracts contain a risk premium that
increases with the time-to-maturity of the contract.
The Bank of Canada has conducted several studies that attempt to estimate time-varying risk
premiums for money market instruments. Gravelle and Morley (1998) and Gravelle, Muller, and
Stréliski (1998) use both a vector-error-correction model (VECM) and a Kalman ﬁlter to estimate
a time-varying parameter model of excess forward returns. Both studies ﬁnd evidence of a time-
varying component in the risk premiums, but conclude that, for short horizons, the EH is a
reasonable characterization of the behaviour of the short end of the yield curve. During periods of
relative interest rate stability and stable inﬂation expectations, the more complicated econometric
models give results almost identical to an expectations-based measure. It is only during “crisis”
4. LIBORisthemostwidelyusedbenchmarkorreferencerateforshort-termU.S.-dollarinterestrates.It
is the rate of interest at which banks borrow funds from other banks in the London interbank market.
Eurodollar futures are ﬁnancial futures that have a ﬁnal settlement value equal to the three-month
LIBOR setting on the day of the contract’s expiry.6
periods and the associated high levels of volatility that the time-varying approaches produce
signiﬁcantly different results.5
The U.S. Federal Reserve has published a number of studies on extracting implied expectations
from market interest rates. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) examine a number of short
maturity assets and determine that federal funds futures contracts dominate all other instruments
in forecasting changes in the federal funds rate over horizons of several months, and that
eurodollar futures perform better than other instruments for the longer horizons. Sack (2002)
demonstrates how to extract policy expectations from these instruments using two models. The
ﬁrst model assumes stable risk premiums, whereas the second allows the risk premiums to be
time-varying. The results show that, for horizons out to one year, the impact of time-varying risk
premiums is limited and that “extracting policy expectations under the assumption of a constant
risk premium may not be too misleading for shorter terms” (Sack 2002, 19).
The recent evidence in support of the EH at the short end of the yield curve is central to the model
of interest rate expectations developed in this paper. When the EH is rejected, there are two
possible reasons. The ﬁrst is that longer-term interest rates have provided accurate measures of
market expectations, but that the expectations have proved to be inaccurate (expectational errors).
The second possibility is that the risk premiums assigned by the market to longer-term rates is not
constant, but rather varies over time. The more recent studies tend to have a shorter horizon and
focus on a more current time period (the 1990s to the present), encompassing a time of generally
increasing central bank transparency. These two factors may have helped to reduce expectational
errors, allowing the EH to hold. Recent changes by the Bank, including an increased level of
transparency and the implementation of its FAD policy, may have similarly resulted in market
participants being able to formulate more accurate expectations. The increased level of
transparency helps to ensure that market participants are aware of the Bank’s view of the
economy, and the implementation of the FAD has removed a large amount of uncertainty as to the
actual timing of changes in the policy rate. If these changes have helped to reduce expectational
errors in the Canadian market, then an expectations-based model may now be accurate over
shorter time horizons. This proposition will be tested by evaluating the EH using a number of
different short-term instruments. If it can be demonstrated that the EH does indeed provide a
reasonable characterization of the term structure of short-term interest rates, then a model based
on this hypothesis should be able to produce accurate measures of near-term expectations.
5. Examples of these crisis periods include the 1992 downgrade of Canada’s foreign currency debt, the
1994 peso crisis, and the 1995 Quebec referendum.7
3. Deﬁnition and Selection of Instruments
It is possible to use a variety of marketable instruments to extract market expectations over the
short term. The periods initially focused on in this paper are one and three months, so the
instruments ﬁrst examined, in terms of maturity, are all three months and under. Speciﬁcally, the
choice set of instruments includes treasury bills, schedule “A” bankers’ acceptances (BAs), term
purchase and resale (repo) agreements, overnight interest rate swaps (OIS), the 30-day overnight
futures contract (ONX), and foreign exchange forward implied rates. The current overnight target
rate is also used as an input. Section 3.1 deﬁnes and describes these various instruments.
3.1 Deﬁnition of instruments
3.1.1 The overnight interest rate
The overnight interest rate market is the market in which funds can be borrowed or lent between
market participants for a term of one business day. The rate at which these transactions are
conducted is referred to as the overnight rate and is quoted on an actual/365-day count basis.
Although this rate is determined by the demand and supply conditions in the market, it is tightly
linked to the Bank’s target rate.
The Bank conducts monetary policy by setting the target for the overnight rate. The target rate is
the midpoint of an upper and lower limit for the overnight rate. The range between the two limits
is referred to as the operating band and is currently set at 50 basis points. The upper limit is the
Bank Rate, which is the rate that the Bank charges to extend an overdraft loan to ﬁnancial
institutions overnight. The lower limit of this operating band is the rate of interest that the Bank
pays to participating institutions that have surplus settlement balances at the end of the day. This
arrangement effectively discourages transactions in the overnight market at rates outside of this
band.
The overnight funding rate ﬂuctuates around the target rate. Since the Bank implemented the FAD
policy in November 2000, the overnight rate has tracked the target rate extremely closely (Figure
1).8
Figure 1: Realized vs Target Overnight Rate
As Figure 1 shows, the relationship between the overnight (ON) rate and the target rate has been
very tight, but it has become even closer since the implementation of the FADs. This relationship
was tested by comparing the sum of squared deviations (SSD) over the two periods.6 In the pre-
FAD period, the SSD was 0.09 basis points, whereas in the post-FAD period it fell to 0.01 basis
points.
3.1.2 Treasury bills
Treasury bills are short-term obligations of the Government of Canada. They are issued regularly
for terms of three months, six months, and one year,7 issued at a discount, pay no coupon, and
mature at par. Prices are calculated on a simple interest basis and an actual/365-day count basis is
used. Although activity in the treasury bill market has declined in recent years as a result of
reduced primary issuance, the market remains quite liquid, with an average daily trading volume
of approximately $4.24 billion.8
6. Calculated usingthe formula .
7. Shorter maturity bills are issued for cash-management purposes at irregular intervals.
8. The outstanding treasury bill stock fell from a high of $170.5 billion in April 1995 to a low of
$78.7 billion in December 2000. It was $104.4billion at year-end 2002. The volume for bothtreasury
bills and BAs is based on 2002 Investment Dealers’ Association statistics.
SSD




The relationship between treasury bill yields and the overnight ﬁnancing rate should be very tight,
because investors have a choice between investing for a ﬁxed term in treasury bills or reinvesting
their funds daily at the overnight rate. Several idiosyncratic factors exist in the treasury bill
market, however, that introduce potential problems in their use as a predictor of future overnight
rates. Speciﬁcally, in the very short end of the market, supply and demand imbalances frequently
result in treasury bills that have under two months to maturity trading below the actual overnight
target.9 This apparent mispricing can be difﬁcult to arbitrage away, as ﬁnancing short positions in
the repo market is problematic.10
3.1.3 Schedule I bankers’ acceptances
Schedule I BAs are tradable short-term corporate obligations that are backed by a line of credit
and are guaranteed by the accepting banks. Although they can be issued for any maturity, BAs are
typically issued for terms of one, two, three, six, and twelve months, with the majority of issuance
concentrated at three months and under. Because they represent a corporate credit, BAs typically
trade at a positive yield spread to government debt (they have a positive credit spread). The short
term to maturity and the fact that they are guaranteed by a Schedule I bank, however, cause the
credit spread to be both small and stable over time. As with treasury bills, BAs are issued at a
discount and are priced using an actual/365-day count basis. BAs have recently represented one of
the most liquid and observable instruments in the money market, with an average daily trading
volume of approximately $6.3 billion.11 While there is no repo market for BAs, which makes
them impossible to sell short, issuance is frequent enough and large enough that any signiﬁcant
overpricing tends to be arbitraged away. This has resulted in BAs having a historically high
correlation with the average overnight funding rate.
3.1.4 Term general collateral purchase and resale agreements
Banks use the overnight general collateral (GC) market to borrow and lend money on a daily
basis, using Government of Canada securities as collateral. The term “general collateral” refers to
the fact that the collateral pledged does not have to be a speciﬁc bond, and therefore the GC
market is not inﬂuenced by a particular issue that is in short supply. As a result, these transactions
are typically done at levels very close to the overnight target rate.
9. This isan example of how preferred habitat canlead to a negative term premium.
10. Selling a treasury bill short involves selling a bill that you do not own, and then borrowing that bill
back in the repomarket to make delivery. For structural reasons, very few short maturity bills are
available to be borrowed in the repo market. This discourages market participants from establishing
short positions in short maturity bills that may appear overpriced.
11. Investment Dealers’ Association industry volume statistics.10
It is possible for banks to borrow and lend for a longer term in this market, effectively locking in a
funding cost for a ﬁxed term (ranging out to one year). Because banks have a choice of either
funding themselves on a daily basis (and assuming the daily reﬁnancing risk) or locking in
funding for a speciﬁc term, the term rates should represent an average of expected future daily
rates, plus a term premium. This would seem to make term GC an ideal candidate for use in
measuring overnight interest rate expectations. This market is relatively illiquid, however, with
transactions occurring infrequently and with larger observed bid-offer spreads than other short-
term assets. As well, largely because of the infrequency of trades, there is no historical database of
term GC yields upon which to conduct analysis.
3.1.5 Overnight index rate swaps
The OIS is a ﬁxed-to-ﬂoating interest rate swap that ties the ﬂoating leg of the contract to a daily
overnight reference rate.12 When an OIS matures, the counterparties exchange the difference
between the ﬁxed rate and the average CORRA rate over the time period covered by the swap,
settling the trade on a net basis. Standard terms of one, two, three, six, and twelve months are
available, but swaps can also be tailored to speciﬁc maturities. The ﬁxed quote on an OIS should
represent the expected average of the overnight target rate over the term of the agreement. The
OIS market is relatively new, however, and there is not yet a sufﬁciently long database of
historical yields to permit robust empirical analysis.13
3.1.6 Overnight repo rate futures (ONX) contracts
The ONX contract is modelled after the federal funds futures contract in the United States, with
each contract representing the expected weighted-average overnight rate for a speciﬁc month (as
measured by CORRA). Since the contracts are priced based on the target overnight rate, they have
no credit-risk component to their yields. As well, since they are futures contracts, short positions
are relatively inexpensive to maintain.
These contracts represent a direct measure of what the CORRA rate is expected to average during
a speciﬁc future month. Any risk premium should simply represent compensation for the level of
uncertainty over future overnight rates. The federal funds futures contract in the United States has
become the standard for measuring market expectations for future changes in the federal funds
rate. A Federal Reserve study (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2002) has shown that, since 1994,
12. The ﬂoating leg of an OIS swap is set to the CORRA (Canadian overnight reporate average) rate,
which is an overnight rate published by the Bank based oninterdealer broker data.
13. DatabasesofhistoricalOISclosesarekeptbybothReutersandBloomberg,datingfromthemiddleof
2001.11
these contracts have dominated all other market interest rates for predicting changes in monetary
policy over horizons out several months. It would seem to be a reasonable assumption that a
Canadian contract following the same speciﬁcations could also perform well. The contract is
fairly new, however, and both open-interest and trading volumes are relatively small compared
with other money market products. This makes the contracts difﬁcult to rely on in isolation,
although they are useful as a check for results obtained using other instruments.
3.1.7 Foreign exchange forward implied rates
It is possible to extract implied term interest rates from the foreign exchange (FX) forward
market. Covered interest rate parity maintains that, for the no-arbitrage condition to hold in
foreign exchange markets, the forward price of a currency must be related to the interest rate
differential between the two currencies that are being quoted. Speciﬁcally:
, (2)
where F is the current forward exchange rate, X is the current spot rate, r is the domestic interest
rate for term t, rf is the foreign interest rate for term t, and t is the time to delivery of the forward
contract (in years).
In Canada, the spread between the spot and forward rates for term t is a function of the spread
between the U.S.-dollar LIBOR and the Canadian-dollar equivalent interest rate over the same
term, t.
FX forward rates are quoted in terms of forward points. These points represent the premium (or
discount) of the forward rate to the spot rate. Given the forward exchange rate, the current spot
rate, the foreign interest rate (LIBOR), and the time to delivery, it is possible to calculate the
implied domestic interest, r. Forward-point markets out to terms of three months are very liquid
and transparent, with an average weekly volume of approximately $36 billion (Bank of Canada
2002).
3.2 Selection of instruments
The instruments selected to test the EH must meet a number of criteria. They must be frequently
traded, liquid instruments with a relatively large outstanding stock or open interest, have minimal
idiosyncratic factors that affect their yield, and should be used by a variety of investors. A large
variety of investors for a given security permits the capture of as broad a base of opinion as
FX 1 r +





possible. The prices of the selected instruments must also be readily observable, so that an
accurate market quote can be consistently obtained. Finally, and equally importantly, a historical
series of yields must be available to allow for robust empirical testing. Table 1 lists the various
money market instruments and identiﬁes their characteristics.
As the table shows, only treasury bills, BAs, and FX forward implied rates meet all of the criteria
needed to test the EH. For this reason, the empirical testing will be restricted to those instruments.
As the graphs in Figure 2 show, the yields on the instruments selected closely track both each
other and the realized average overnight rate over their maturity.
Table 1: Money Market Instruments






Treasury bills Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schedule I BAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term GC No Yes No No
OIS swaps Yes Yes Yes No
ONX contracts No No No No
FX forward Yes Yes Yes Yes13
Figure 2: One- and Three-Month Market Rates14
4. A Comparison of Pre- and Post-FAD Periods
The various instruments are examined over the pre- and post-FAD periods. For this study, the pre-
FAD period covers from 2 July 1996 to 31 October 2000, and the post-FAD period from 1 November
2000 to 26 March 2003. Each sample is evaluated independently for each instrument. The results
are examined to determine two points: whether one instrument dominates the others in terms of
explanatory power, and whether the explanatory power of the instruments is changed by the
implementation of the FAD regime.
4.1 Statistical summary of the periods
4.1.1 One-month assets
The graphs and statistics contained in Figure 3 show the ex-post excess returns earned for one-
month BAs, treasury bills, and FX forward implied rates over the periods examined.14 Two main
points arise. First, while excess returns from BAs and FX implied yields appear to be slightly
positive on average, treasury bill excess returns are larger in absolute magnitude and
predominantly negative. Treasury bills, as direct obligations of the government, carry no credit
risk. The positive excess for both BAs and FX implied yields is partially composed of a credit
spread. The combination of no credit spread and a preferred habitat effect produces negative
excess returns (a negative risk premium) for treasury bills. Second, all of the excess returns appear
to have become less volatile in the post-FAD regime.
Figure 3: Excess Returns
14. The excess returnis the difference in return earned by holding the term asset versus rolling the





























































































Figure 3 (continued): Excess Returns16
Figure 3 shows that, compared with treasury bills, BAs and FX implied rates have excess returns
that are smaller in magnitude and less volatile in both the pre- and post-FAD periods. As well, the
absolute values for the excess returns for BAs and treasury bills decrease in the post-FAD period.
For BAs, the mean excess return falls from approximately 10 basis points to 4.5 basis points. For
treasury bills, the mean moves from -30 basis points to -16 basis points. These differences are
signiﬁcant at the 99 per cent conﬁdence level.15 The results for the FX forward implied rates show
the opposite behaviour, however, with the excess return increasing from an average of 7.3 basis
points to 8.7 basis points. This difference, while relatively small, is still statistically signiﬁcant.16
Volatility of the excess returns (as measured by the standard deviation) falls signiﬁcantly for all
three assets in the post-FAD period. Table 2 shows that the correlation between the excess returns
of the various assets does not change materially between the pre- and post-FAD periods. The
correlations between treasury bills and the other instruments remain relatively low, highlighting
the importance of security-speciﬁc factors in the pricing of one-month treasury bills.







BAs - 0.56 0.70 BAs - 0.53 0.68
T-bills 0.56 - 0.44 T-bills 0.53 - 0.44
FX implied 0.70 0.44 - FX implied 0.68 0.44 -
15. Thep values for a heteroscedastict-test for both BAs and treasury bills are 0.00.












































Figure 3 (concluded): Excess Returns17
Excess returns are a measure of the risk premium associated with the asset, so lower and less
variable excess returns are indicative of smaller risk premiums (the negative excess returns for
treasury bills highlight the riskless nature of that asset). The smaller, less variable excess returns
in evidence in the post-FAD period are consistent with smaller risk premiums being required.
Although we cannot ﬁrmly establish a causal link, these results do at least suggest that the
implementation of the FAD regime may have increased the pricing efﬁciency and lowered the risk
premium of the one-month assets examined.
4.1.2 Three-month assets
The graphs and statistics contained in Figure 4 show the same excess return information for the
three-month assets.































































































The summary statistics for the three-month assets show very different results than they did for the
one-month assets. Whereas one-month assets generally show material decreases in both the
absolute magnitude and variance of excess returns, for three-month assets only treasury bills show
any statistically signiﬁcant improvement. For BAs and FX forward implied rates, there is little











































Figure 4 (concluded): Excess Returns19
periods. Only treasury bills show a signiﬁcant reduction in their risk premium after the
implementation of the FAD regime.17 The histograms also show that the distributions of excess
returns look much less normal in the post-FAD period. The correlations of excess returns (Table
3), although high even in the pre-FAD period, become extremely high after the introduction of the
FAD regime. The pricing behaviour of three-month assets appears to be far more homogeneous
than it is for one-month assets, with security-speciﬁc factors playing a smaller role.
The excess returns for the three-month assets probably behaved in this manner in the post-FAD
period because of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The emergency easing that followed
the attacks (i.e., outside of the normal FAD dates) would likely have had a large negative impact
on the explanatory power of the various assets examined. The ﬁnancial markets could not possibly
have been able to anticipate such an event or the between-FAD emergency easing that followed,
so excess returns would have been skewed artiﬁcially higher as a result of large expectational
errors. The smaller sample size of the post-FAD period would exacerbate the problem. The effect
would be larger for three-month assets, as their excess returns would be impacted for the three
months prior to the emergency easing. This would result in 90 days of abnormal returns out of a
sample of 562 days (16 per cent of the sample). In comparison, one-month assets would have only
30 days of abnormal returns (5 per cent of the sample). This conclusion is supported by the
change in the skewness of the distributions. The histograms show that the distributions of excess
returns become much more positively skewed in the post-FAD period. In section 4.2, it will be
possible to adjust for the presence of this 11 September 2001 distortion when testing the
explanatory power of the various assets.
17. Thepvaluesforaheteroscedastict-testforBAsandFXimpliedyieldsare0.27and0.62,respectively.
For treasury bills, thepvalue is 0.00.







BAs - 0.88 0.93 BAs - 0.97 0.97
T-bills 0.88 - 0.83 T-bills 0.97 - 0.95
FX implied 0.93 0.83 - FX implied 0.97 0.95 -20
4.2 Testing the expectations hypothesis
The one-month statistical summary shows that, compared with treasury bills, BAs and FX implied
yields have excess returns that are smaller in absolute magnitude and less variable in both the pre-
and post-FAD periods. As well, the excess returns are generally smaller and less volatile after the
implementation of the FAD regime. For three-month assets, treasury bills and BAs have the
smallest absolute excess returns, and only treasury bills show a material decrease in the size of the
excess returns in the post-FAD period. These summary statistics do not, however, indicate how
effective these assets have been as predictors of the average realized overnight rate over their time
to maturity, or whether this effectiveness has changed with the shift to the FAD regime. To do this,
it is necessary to test the EH directly over the two periods, which means that it is necessary to
deﬁne some forecasting equations to measure the explanatory power of the various assets.
According to the EH, the yield on a short-term asset from time t to time t+r, which will be
denoted as Yt,t+r, should be determined by the expected average overnight rate, ONt+j, that will be
realized over the period, plus a constant risk premium, :
. (3)
To estimate this relationship using an ordinary least-squares regression, equation (3) can be
moved forward in time (using realized geometric average overnight rates) and rearranged to
produce the following regression equation:
, (4)
where  is the compounded return earned from rolling an
investment over at the overnight rate.
According to the EH,  would be equal to one,  would be equal to the constant risk premium,
and  is the residual error. The coefﬁcients that would be obtained by estimating equation (4)
directly, however, would be dominated by the long-run relationships between the variables.18
18. To estimate equation (4) directly is essentially a test of cointegration between the asset’s current yield
(Yt)andthesubsequentrealizedovernightrates(ONt,t+r).Preliminarytestsofthismodelfoundstrong
evidence of cointegration, producing point estimates of that ranged between 0.99 and 1.00 for all
assets. This can be interpreted as at least weak evidence that the EH could hold overthe long term.
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Since the focus of this paper is on the short-run relationships (predicting the overnight rate over
the next several months), the standard practice of stochastically detrending the equation by
subtracting the current level of the overnight rate is followed. The regression equation becomes:
. (5)
This regression is estimated using historical yields for all three assets as the independent variable
Yt,t+r for both sample periods. The estimation was performed using daily closing yields. This
provided 1,087 observations in the pre-FAD period for both one- and three-month assets. In the
post-FAD period, there were 601 observations for one-month assets and 562 observations for
three-month assets.
To determine each asset’s explanatory power in the post-FAD period, it was necessary to adjust
for the impact of the emergency easing that occurred in response to the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001. This was done by adding a dummy variable to equation (5) in the post-FAD
regressions. The variable is set to a value of zero if the excess return value for a given date
is not impacted by the emergency easing, and to a value of one if the asset’s excess return is
impacted by the emergency easing (i.e., the easing occurred within t+30 days for one-month
assets and t+90 days for three-month assets).
4.2.1 One-month assets
Table 4 reports the results of regressions run using one-month assets.
ONtt r + , ONt – a – b Ytt r + , ONt – () e ++ =
Qsep1122
The regressions show that BAs clearly emerge as the one-month instrument with the most
explanatory power, having the highest adjusted R2 value in both the pre- and post-FAD periods.
Although the EH can be rejected in the pre-FAD period for all of the instruments tested (  is
signiﬁcantly different from one), in the post-FAD period it cannot be rejected when one-month
BA yields are used. In samples where is not signiﬁcantly different from one, an estimate of the
term premium can be made by re-estimating the regression equation and forcing the value of to
equal 1.0. In this re-estimation, the value of  that is produced for one-month BAs (3.9 basis
points) can be interpreted as being the average risk premium over the post-FAD period. The
standard error of the risk premium is very small (0.5 basis points), which indicates that the value
is fairly stable over the entire sample. The dummy variable for the 11 September effect in the
post-FAD period is negative and signiﬁcantly different from zero in every case, which indicates
the presence of abnormally positive returns during that period.


















































































a. The White test statistic indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The p-value (in parentheses)
represents the probability that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected.
b. The Durbin-Watson statistics are all well below 2, which indicates a serial correlation of residuals. The residuals
are also heteroscedastic. The Newey-West HAC standard-error terms are shown in parentheses and are robust to
both the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of the residuals.
c. The Chow breakpoint test is used to determine whether there is a structural break in the estimated equations. In
all cases, the p values are 0.00, which indicates a signiﬁcant structural break.
d. The p values are shown in parentheses. Values of that are not signiﬁcantly different from one at the 10 per cent
conﬁdence level are indicated by an asterisk.
e. When the EH cannot be rejected, the term premium is obtained by re-estimating the equation and forcing the
value of  to equal one.







The EH can be rejected in both the pre- and post-FAD periods for treasury bills and FX implied
rates. Treasury bills also have a surprisingly low explanatory power in the pre-FAD regime, with
an adjusted R2 of essentially zero. While this seems counterintuitive, an examination of Figure 3
(one-month excess returns) shows that, in the pre-FAD period, excess returns on one-month
treasury bills were very large in magnitude and extremely volatile. It would appear that security-
speciﬁc factors dominated the pricing of one-month treasury bills, leaving only a very tenuous
relationship to the average level of overnight rates.
All regressions show high levels of both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the residual
series. This is not surprising, given the speciﬁcation of the regression equation. The regression
attempts to estimate ex-ante expectations of future overnight rates using ex-post excess returns.
By deﬁnition, the residual series is inﬂuenced by large expectational errors (when realized
overnight rates are different from what was anticipated by the market). Figure 5 plots the residual
series for one-month BAs, both for the full sample and for the post-FAD period. Residuals appear
to have become smaller in the post-FAD period, with periods of general stability punctuated by
spikes higher and lower. The spikes in the series marked with circles indicate episodes where the
market was “surprised” by changes in the overnight rate. In these cases, the EH may have
accurately measured expectations, but these expectations turned out to be incorrect. This
behaviour leads to both heteroscedasticity (since the expectational errors lead to inconsistent
variance) and serial correlation (the expectational errors affect excess returns for a number of
consecutive periods). Nevertheless, the point estimates produced by the regressions are still
unbiased estimates. The standard errors, however, have been calculated using a Newey-West
covariance matrix and are robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
Figure 5: Residual Plots24
Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models are inappropriate for
modelling the heteroscedasticity, because changes in the variance are not persistent. Since, by
deﬁnition, the heteroscedasticity in the residuals is caused largely by expectational errors, prior
levels of variance would be of little help in forecasting future levels (previous surprises don’t
provide information about future surprises).
Again, while no causality has been proven, the shift to the FAD regime appears to have been
accompanied by a material increase in the pricing efﬁciency of one-month assets. The explanatory
power of every asset increases substantially in the post-FAD period, and the EH could not be
rejected in the post-FAD period when using one-month BAs. The Chow tests show that there is a
deﬁnite structural break between the two periods. The proposition that the implementation of the
FAD regime may be responsible for this improvement can be supported by observing the value of
both the  and  coefﬁcients over time. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the values of the
estimates of both coefﬁcients using a rolling window of 601 observations (the length of the post-
FAD period). The sample is rolling, so the ﬁrst observation after the vertical line covers one day
post-FAD and 600 days pre-FAD. The process continues until the ﬁnal observation, which is an
entirely post-FAD sample. The graphs show that, after a brief period of time, as the rolling
window moves beyond the implementation date, the value of  that the regression produced
moves fairly quickly to converge towards the expected value of one. Once it reaches one, its value
seems to become quite stable relative to prior periods. The values of begin to move lower after
the implementation of the FAD (apart from a spike higher around 11 September 2001), ending the
period at the lowest level in the sample. The implementation of the FAD regime appears to
coincide with both a move of the  estimates towards one and a move lower in the  estimates
(risk premium). This provides additional support for the proposition that the increased evidence in
favour of the EH in the post-FAD period is indeed the result of the new policy framework.






Table 5 shows the results of regressions performed on the three-month assets.
The three-month regressions yield results similar to those obtained using the one-month assets.
The ranking of the assets in the pre-FAD period is the same as it was in the one-month
regressions, with treasury bills performing the worst of all the assets and BAs performing the best.
Again, all three assets show signiﬁcant increases in their explanatory power, with all of the
adjusted R2 values over 80 per cent. Treasury bills move from last to ﬁrst place, with an adjusted
R2of almost 85 per cent, although the difference between ﬁrst and last place is only 3.2 per cent.
The 11 September dummy variable is negative and signiﬁcantly different from zero in every case,
which indicates the presence of abnormal excess returns around that event.





a. The White test statistic indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The p-value (in parentheses)
represents the probability that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected.
DWb
b. The Durbin-Watson statistics are all well below 2, which indicates a serial correlation of residuals. The residuals
are also heteroscedastic. The Newey-West HAC standard-error terms are shown in parentheses and are robust to
both the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of the residuals.
Chow
testc
c. The Chow breakpoint test is used to determine whether there is a structural break in the estimated equations. In
all cases, the p values are 0.00, which indicates a signiﬁcant structural break.
T-statd
d. The p values are shown in parentheses. Values of that are not signiﬁcantly different from one at the 10 per cent
conﬁdence level are indicated by an asterisk.
Term
premiume
e. When the EH cannot be rejected, the term premium is obtained by re-estimating the equation and forcing the























































































The EH cannot be rejected in the post-FAD period for any of the three assets. In every case,  is
not signiﬁcantly different from one. The EH also cannot be rejected in the pre-FAD period using
either BA or FX implied rates. The three-month assets also appear to have had material increases
in their explanatory power in the post-FAD period, and again the Chow tests show a structural
break between the two periods for every asset. Although it is not possible to assign causality, the
three-month assets also exhibit signiﬁcant improvements in explanatory power and pricing
efﬁciency in the post-FAD period.
The three-month regressions show similar levels of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of
residuals, as do the one-month assets. Figure 7 plots the residual series for three-month BAs in
both the full period and the post-FAD period. As with one-month BAs, the post-FAD residual
series appears to be generally more stable, although it is also marked by a number of spikes.
Those spikes in the series that coincide with the surprises shown in the one-month series are again
indicated with circles. As with the one-month assets, the residual series is inﬂuenced by relatively
large expectational errors, leading to both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. GARCH
models are again inappropriate, but Newey-West standard errors are used for any hypothesis
testing.
Figure 7: Residual Plots
The same stability tests are performed to determine how the estimates of the and coefﬁcients
evolved over time for the three-month assets. Figure 8 shows a pattern similar, if somewhat less
extreme, to that of Figure 5 for the one-month assets. After a brief adjustment period as the rolling
window moves past the FAD implementation date, the value of  moves to converge towards a
value of one, and the estimates of  start to trend lower, eventually settling at approximately 10





Figure 8: Rolling Coefﬁcient Estimates
4.3 Final rankings and term premium estimates
Tables 6 and 7 rank the various assets in both the pre- and post-FAD samples. The assets are
ranked in the order of their explanatory power (adjusted R2 value). Also identiﬁed are the
estimated values for their term premiums and whether the EH can be rejected.





a. If the EH cannot be rejected, the term premium is estimated by setting equal to 1.0 and re-estimating the equation. If EH








1 BA 39.5% 10 bps Yes BA 51.8% 16 bps No
2 FX implied 18.1% 7 bps Yes FX implied 44.4% 24 bps No
3 Treasury bill 0.2% -30 bps Yes Treasury bill 19.4% -12 bps Yes












1 BA 82.0% 4 bps No Treasury bill 84.9% -2 bps No
2 Treasury bill 67.9% -16 bps Yes BA 83.4% 11 bps No
3 FX implied 66.4% 9 bps Yes FX implied 81.7% 20 bps No
b28
In the one-month sector, BAs emerge as the asset of choice to measure implied expectations,
having the highest explanatory power and the lowest term premium (in absolute values). In the
three-month sector, treasury bills have the highest adjusted R2 and the smallest term premium in
the post-FAD period. The explanatory power of the three assets is very close, however, with all
assets having an adjusted R2 in excess of 80 per cent. As well, the EH could not be rejected for
any of the three-month assets in the post-FAD period.
The inability to reject the EH runs counter to much of the published research on the topic;
however, some key differences between this and previous work that has rejected the EH can
account for this discrepancy. First, relatively little empirical work has been done on the Canadian
market. The work that has been done generally looks at only treasury bills and examines a much
earlier time period (Hejazi, Lai, and Yang 2000 examine the period from 1960 to 1995). One of
the main propositions of the current paper is that the shift to a FAD regime, as well as generally
increased transparency, may have helped to reduce expectational errors and improve the efﬁciency
of the pricing of short-term assets, allowing the EH to hold. The second difference is that much of
the work that rejects the EH in the U.S. market focuses on assets of a longer term-to-maturity,
often testing long bond rates (e.g., Campbell 1995; Schiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz 1983;
and Fama and Bliss 1987). Recent work that focuses on the very short end of both the U.S. and
European yield curve ﬁnds that the EH does hold, and that term rates are unbiased estimators of
future average overnight rates (Longstaff 2000b; Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2002; Durre,
Snorre, and Pilegaard 2003).
Strictly following the preceding results, we should use a yield curve built from a combination of
one-month BAs and three-month treasury bills to extract implied forward rates. To keep
consistency of instruments, though, and since we lose very little incremental explanatory power,
BAs will be used for both the one- and three-month terms.19
The graphs in Figure 9 plot the actual versus the in-sample ﬁtted values for the overnight rate.
Both one- and three-month BAs are used as independent variables. As the graphs show, the ﬁtted
values for the overnight rate closely track the actual realized values. As one would expect, the
relationship is tighter for the one-month horizon.
19. Consistency of instruments across maturities allows for easier interpolation between data points.29
Figure 9: Actual vs Predicted Overnight Rates30
5. Expectations Over a Longer Horizon
5.1 Selection of instruments
The assets examined to this point have all been three months or less in maturity. This allows for
the measurement of expectations out to three months in the future, covering at least the next two
FADs. It is desirable, however, to have a way of measuring expectations for monetary policy
beyond the next three months. Looking at expectations over a one-year horizon can be particularly
helpful when trying to determine the expected timing of turning points in the interest rate path, or
measuring the degree of cumulative tightening or easing expected up to a speciﬁc point in the
future.
This measurement requires the use of assets that have a longer term-to-maturity than those
examined thus far. The maturity of the assets selected needs to be at least as long as the time
period over which expectations are to be measured. The assets selected need to meet the same
criteria as those used at the shorter end of the maturity spectrum. They need to be frequently
traded, liquid instruments with narrow bid/ask spreads and a large outstanding stock. Ideally, as
with the shorter-term assets, the EH would not be able to be rejected.
Because BAs are the instruments used to construct the yield curve for maturities under three
months, and because of the desirability to maintain consistency of instruments across the maturity
spectrum, it would seem that longer-dated BAs would be an ideal candidate. There are problems
with this approach, however. Although BAs are issued with terms-to-maturity of six and twelve
months, these maturity tranches are quite illiquid.
There is an alternative to using longer-maturity BAs that still maintains the consistency of
instruments: the 90-day bankers’ acceptance futures contract (BAX), which trades on the
Montreal Exchange. These contracts are similar to the eurodollar futures contracts in the United
States. A BAX contract represents a notional amount of $1 million worth of three-month BAs,
follows the International Monetary Market (IMM) dating standards, and converges to the three-
month BA rate upon settlement.20,21 The contracts currently represent one of the most liquid
instruments in the Canadian money market, with average daily volume in the most active
20. The IMM isa division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Financial futures contracts on this (and
other) exchanges expire two business days prior to the third Wednesday of March, June, September,
and December. These dates are referred toas IMM dates.
21. The BAX contract actually converges to the three-month BA rate, as measured by the daily survey of
money market rates conducted by the Investment Dealers’ Association of Canada.31
contracts of approximately $1.2 billion.22 While contracts exist that settle on the IMM dates for
the next two years, volume and open interest drop off fairly sharply after the ﬁrst three contracts.
The existence of these contracts allows the creation of “synthetic” BAs with terms-to-maturity of
out to almost one year (using only the front three contracts). These synthetic BAs can then be used
to measure expectations over a longer time horizon. To determine how effective these contracts
are as indicators of expectations, however, it is necessary to test them using a version of the EH
equation. Ideally, as with the shorter-term assets, these contracts will be shown to have a high
degree of explanatory power and the EH would not be rejected. This test will also allow an
estimation of what, if any, risk premiums exist in the various contracts.
5.2 Testing bankers’ acceptance futures
This section will test whether BAX contracts represent unbiased predictors of future three-month
BA rates. A version of equation (5) will be used, modiﬁed slightly to use the observed yields on
the BAX contracts as the independent variable and the three-month BA rate at the contract’s
settlement as the dependent variable. A dummy variable will again be included to adjust for the
impact of 11 September 2001. The equation will also contain a term to represent the time to
settlement for the contract. This will allow the estimated risk premiums to change as the various
contracts move closer to maturity. The speciﬁc equation is as follows:
, (6)
where 3mBAm is the three-month BA rate at the time of the front BAX contract’s settlement,
3mBAt is the current three-month BA rate at time t, BAXt is the BAX contract yield at time t,i s
the risk premium, and d is the time to the contract’s settlement (in days).23
The equation is estimated using daily data for both the pre- and post-FAD periods to determine
whether the predicted change in three-month BA yields (BAXt-3mBAt) is an unbiased predictor of
the actual change (3mBAm-3mBAt). The null hypothesis is again . Table 8 shows the
regression results.
22. The volume data are from the Montreal Exchange.
23. Daystosettlementaredividedby100intheestimation.Thisallowsalltheindependentvariablestobe
of similar magnitude.
3mBAm 3mBAt – a – b1 BAXt 3mBAt – () b 2 d () b 3 Qsep11 () e ++ + + =
a
b 1 =32
The results of the regressions show that, for the entire sample period, the EH cannot be rejected at
the 90 per cent conﬁdence level for the ﬁrst and third contracts, and at the 95 per cent conﬁdence
level for the second contract. The value of  is signiﬁcant only for the front contract, indicating
that, for it, the risk premium declines as the contract moves closer to its settlement date. The
estimate of  for the front contract is zero, which shows that the entire risk premium is captured
in the estimate of . For the second and third contracts, the value of the  coefﬁcients is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero, while the estimates of  are all positive and signiﬁcantly
different from zero, which indicates a risk premium for these contracts that does not vary
signiﬁcantly over the term of the contract. This makes intuitive sense, because pricing of the front






































































































































a. The White test statistic indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The p-value (in parenthe-
ses) represents the probability that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected.
b. The Durbin-Watson statistics are all well below 2, which indicates a serial correlation of residuals. The residu-
als are also heteroscedastic. The Newey-West HAC standard-error terms are shown in parentheses and are
robust to both the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of the residuals.
c. The Chow breakpoint test is used to determine whether there is a structural break in the estimated equations. In
all cases, the p values are 0.00, which indicates a signiﬁcant structural break.
d. The p values are shown in parentheses. Values of that are not signiﬁcantly different from one at the 10 per
cent conﬁdence level are indicated by an asterisk.






contract is heavily inﬂuenced by the fact that its yield must converge to the three-month BA rate
over a relatively short period of time (between 1 and 91 days). The closer to settlement the
contract is, the more certainty there is regarding its ﬁnal value. For the second and third contracts,
their longer time to settlement (92 to 181 days for the second and 182 to 273 days for the third)
make them less inﬂuenced by this convergence. The predictive power of these contracts is
relatively strong, with adjusted R2 values ranging from 47 per cent to 73 per cent.
The results for the subperiods are much less satisfactory. The estimates of  are very volatile,
with the EH being rejected in both subperiods for the front contract, in the pre-FAD period for the
second contract, and in the post-FAD period for the third contract. This behaviour is likely due to
a small-sample-size problem and large expectational errors (given the longer term of these assets).
The path of interest rates within the two subperiods helps to demonstrate this problem. As Figure
10 shows, the pre-FAD period (to the left of the vertical line) is marked by generally rising interest
rates, with BAX yields climbing from approximately 3 per cent to 6 per cent. In the post-FAD
period, on the other hand, rates fall rapidly from 6 per cent to 2 per cent. It is possible that market
expectations consistently underestimate the degree of tightening in the pre-FAD period, and
consistently underestimate the degree of easing in the post-FAD period.24 This is indicative of a
small-sample-size problem, and over an entire interest rate cycle the directional forecast errors net
out.
Figure 10: BAX Yields
24. Market commentary overthese periods is consistent with the proposition that the pace of changes in
the overnight rateis in excess of that expected by market participants.
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It is also possible that the shift to the FAD regime has less of an impact on the BAX market than it
does on the shorter-maturity BA and treasury bill markets. The pricing of the one- and three-
month instruments examined earlier is very sensitive to the speciﬁc timing of changes in the
overnight rate. For a one-month asset, the exact day of a change in the overnight rate makes a
signiﬁcant impact on the pricing of the instrument. The BAX contracts, however, measure
expectations over a longer horizon (from six to twelve months). This makes them less sensitive to
the actual timing of the moves than to the general overall trend of monetary policy.
The full-period results of the regressions that are shown in Table 8 do support the hypothesis that,
over an entire interest rate cycle, the front three BAX futures contracts are rational estimators of
future three-month BA rates. The EH cannot be rejected at the 90 per cent conﬁdence level for the
ﬁrst and third contracts, nor at the 95 per cent level for the second contract. These results are less
robust than those obtained using one- and three-month assets, and it is possible that the maturity
spectrum has moved far enough along that the time-varying component of the risk premium has
become signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the results are sufﬁciently strong that they warrant the inclusion
of the BAX contracts into the expectations model. The additional information content, combined
with the fact that these contracts are widely used by market participants as a means of hedging
and speculating on future changes in the overnight rate, outweighs the increased uncertainty
generated by moving further along the time-to-maturity spectrum.
Given that the BAX contracts will be included in the expectations model, the regression equations
are re-estimated to provide estimates of the values of the various risk premiums. Since the EH
cannot be rejected, the equations are re-estimated with the value of  set to 1.0. As well, for the
second and third contracts, the coefﬁcient  is set to zero. Table 9 shows the resulting term
premium estimates.
Table 9: BAX Term Premium Estimates
Contract Term premium estimatea
(relative to three-month BA)
a. Standard-error estimates appear in parentheses.
Total term premiumb
b. The total term premium consists of the term premium estimated for each BAX con-
tract relative to the three-month BA rate, plus the estimated three-month BA term pre-
mium (11 basis points).
Front 0.11 * (days to settle)
(0.07)










The initial term premium values represent the premiums for the various BAX contracts relative to
the value of a three-month BA at the time of the contract’s settlement, whereas the total term
premium values are relative to the overnight target. Figure 11 shows an estimated range of values
(plus/minus one standard error) for the term premium on the various instruments.
Figure 11: Term Premium Ranges
As Figure 11 shows, the estimates for the values of the term premiums range from very small and
stable (one-month BAs, which have an estimate of 4 basis points and a standard error of 0.5 basis
points) to fairly large and uncertain (the third BAX contract, which has an estimate of 39 basis
points and a standard error of almost 6 basis points). Clearly, as the time horizon is extended,
measures of expectations become increasingly uncertain. Estimates obtained using one- and
three-month BAs appear to be quite precise. Once BAX contracts are introduced, these estimates
become increasingly uncertain.
5.3 Generation of a spot BA yield curve
Once the observed yields on the various BAs and BAX contracts are adjusted for the presence of a
term premium, the resulting yields can be used to build a spot BA yield curve with maturities
extending out to approximately one year. This yield curve is generated by “rolling” together a
series of BAs and BAX contracts to solve for the spot rate for any given maturity. The following
example demonstrates the process, using price data from 17 December 2002:36
One-month BA: 2.81% market yield less 4 bps term premium = 2.77%
Three-month BA: 2.87% market yield less 11 bps term premium = 2.76%
Front BAX (17 Mar 2003): 2.85% market yields less 21 bps term premium = 2.64%
Second BAX (16 Jun 2003): 3.03% market yields less 26 bps term premium = 2.77%
Third BAX (15 Sep 2003): 3.23% market yields less 39 bps term premium = 2.84%
A six-month BA can be replicated by purchasing a three-month BA and the front BAX contract,
which settles on 17 March 2003. The payoff from this strategy is depicted by the following
timeline:
The six-month (181-day) rate is replicated by purchasing a three-month BA and rolling the
investment over into another three-month BA at a guaranteed rate by using the BAX futures
contracts. The effective rate is calculated as follows:
FV = (1.0276(90/365))(1.0264(91/365))
FV = 1.0133
181-day rate = FV(365/181)
181-day rate = 2.70 per cent.
This process can be extended to include the next two contracts, generating spot yields out to
15 December 2003.
6. Implied Forward Rates
The EH has been shown to provide a reasonably accurate description of the behaviour of yields in
the Canadian money market. This implies that current market yields can be used to extract market






be constructed using adjusted market rates for BAs and BAX contracts. This spot curve can then
be used to calculate a series of implied forward overnight rates for various points in the future.
These implied forward rates represent the market’s expectation of the level of the overnight rate at
a speciﬁc point in time.
Implied forward rates are essentially break-even rates; they represent what the level of a future
interest rate would have to be to equate the holding-period returns of two different investment
strategies. This is simply an extension of the EH, which states that the yield on a multi-period
asset is the geometric average of expected future overnight rates, plus a risk premium.
The forward rate f at time a for period b can be expressed by the following equation:
, (7)
where z is the spot interest rate for a given maturity.
Using this methodology, the spot yield curve can be used to calculate the implied forward short
rate for any speciﬁc date in the horizon under examination. Since we have restricted the spot yield
curve to assets with a time to maturity of approximately one year and less, it is only possible to
calculate forward interest rates going out to twelve months. This period, however, covers the
horizon that is of most interest to policy-makers. Expectations become far more uncertain
extending beyond one year.
The following two examples show two ways of deriving market expectations using implied
forward rates. The examples represent two different interest rate environments: one of
expectations of rising overnight rates, and the other of expectations of stable rates.
The ﬁrst step in this process is to create a spot yield curve from the observed yields on BAs and
BAX futures contracts. Section 5.3 outlined the process by which the prices of BAX contracts can
be used to determine longer-term BA rates. Spot yields for the one- and three-month BAs are
combined with yields implied by the BAX contracts and an interpolation algorithm is used to
construct a smooth spot yield curve.
The ﬁrst example shows an environment in which expectations are for gradually increasing
interest rates (Table 10).
f
1 z ab + () + ()
ab + ()
1 za + ()
a ------------------------------------------ 1 – =38
These adjusted yields are used to create a spot yield curve (Table 11).
The ﬁnal adjusted yield curve can be used to extract market expectations by using the implied
forward overnight rates as of the upcoming FADs. In this example, the nine-month horizon spans
six FADs. Table 12 shows implied overnight rates following each of the FADs and the associated
probabilities for a change in the overnight rate.









Overnight rate 9 May 2002 2.25 0 2.25
1-month BA 11 June 2002 2.34 4 bps 2.30
3-month BA 13 August 2002 2.55 11 bps 2.44
Front BAX 17 Jun to 16 Sep
2002
2.73 15 bpsa 2.58
Second BAX 17 Sep to 16 Dec
2002
3.20 26 bps 2.94
Third BAX 17 Dec to 16 Mar
2003
3.78 39 bps 3.39
a. The front BAX contract has 40 days to expiry. The BAX term premium is calculated as 0.11 * 40
days. The result (4.4 basis points) is added to the three-month BA term premium of 11 basis points.
Table 11: 8 May 2002, Spot Yield Curve
Term Spot yield (per cent)
1-day - 9 May 2002 2.25
1-month - 8 June 2002 2.28
3-month - 8 August 2002 2.43
6-month - 8 November 2002 2.60
9-month - 8 February 2003 2.8039
As Table 12 shows, the market has fully priced in an increase in the overnight rate on the 4 June
2002 FAD from 2.25 per cent to 2.50 per cent. The 16 July 2002 FAD, however, has only a 16 per
cent chance of a further hike from 2.50 per cent to 2.75 per cent priced in. The following FADs
have progressively more tightening priced, with a total of 110 basis points of tightening priced in
for the January 2003 FAD. The expected path of future overnight rates is depicted in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Implied Overnight Rates
There are, however, some caveats to the probability calculations that appear in Table 12. The
implied overnight rate gives the market’s current expectation as to what level the overnight rate
will be at on a given date. It does not provide information about the path that rates will take to





Probability of rate change
4 June 2002 2.50 100% of an increase to 2.50%
16 July 2002 2.54 16% of a further increase to 2.75%
4 September 2002 2.70 80% of a further increase to 2.75%
16 October 2002 2.86 44% of a further increase to 3.00%
3 December 2002 3.03 12% of a further increase to 3.25%
21 January 2003 3.35 40% of a further increase to 3.50%40
reach that level. The probability calculation assumes that the overnight rate can assume one of
only two discrete values at the next FAD date. This is clearly an oversimpliﬁcation, as there are
some non-zero probabilities that the overnight rate could assume a wider range of possible values.
Although the example above suggests that the market has priced in a 25 basis point increase in
administered rates with 100 per cent certainty, it is also possible that expectations are split, with
50 per cent expecting no move and 50 per cent expecting a 50 basis point increase. Market
convention, however, is to base probabilities on discrete intervals of 25 basis points, because,
historically, the Bank has limited its changes to the overnight rate to increments of 25 (e.g., 25,
50, or 75 basis points). To transform the expected level of the overnight rate into a probability, it is
necessary to assume that the current overnight rate (ONt) can assume only two values after an
upcoming FAD. Those values are ONt with probability 1-P and ONt+1 with probability P. The
value for P can then be solved as follows:
, (8)
where f is the implied overnight rate at a point in the future.
The second example is from 17 December 2002 and represents a period of generally stable
interest rate expectations (Table 13).









Overnight rate 18 December 2002 2.75 0 2.75
1-month BA 20 January 2003 2.81 4 bps 2.77
3-month BA 17 March 2003 2.85 11 bps 2.74
Front BAX 17 Mar to 16 Jun 2003 2.85 21 bpsa
a. The front BAX contract has 90 days to expiry. The BAX term premium is calculated as 0.11 * 90 days, which
results in 9.9 basis points being added to the three-month BA term premium.
2.64
Second BAX 17 Jun to 15 Sep 2003 3.03 26 bps 2.77
Third BAX 16 Sep to 15 Dec 2003 3.23 39 bps 2.84
P
fO N t – ()
ONt 1 + ONt – ()
--------------------------------------- =41
These yields are used to create a spot yield curve (Table 14).
As Table 14 shows, once the various instruments are adjusted for term premiums, the yield curve
is ﬂat at approximately the current overnight rate of 2.75 per cent over the entire nine-month
horizon. This is clearly indicative of market expectations for no change in policy. The actual
implied forward rates are shown in Table 15.
Table 14: 17 December 2002, Spot Yield Curve
Term Spot yield (per cent)
1-day - 18 December 2002 2.75
1-month - 18 January 2003 2.75
3-month - 18 March 2003 2.74
6-month - 18 June 2003 2.70
9-month - 18 September 2003 2.73





Probability of rate change
21 January 2003 2.75 0% chance of a change
4 March 2003 2.73 8% chance of a decrease to 2.50%
15 April 2003 2.65 40% chance of a decrease to 2.50%
3 June 2003 2.65 40% chance of a decrease to 2.50%
15 July 2003 2.73 8% chance of a decrease to 2.50%
3 September 2003 2.75 0% chance of a change42
Figure 13: Implied Overnight Rates
As Table 15 and Figure 13 show, market expectations on 17 December 2002 are for no change in
the overnight rate at either of the next two FADs and relatively stable rates going forward.
While the forward-rate model produces speciﬁc results, some judgment must be applied in their
interpretation. Table 15 shows that the implied overnight rate at the April and June FADs shows
some probability of a decrease in administered rates. This result is inconsistent with other
measures of expectations (such as survey date) and counter to the general market sentiment at the
time (for stable rates). This decline in the forward rates over the April to June period is a result of
the fact that the adjusted six-month spot rate (2.70 per cent) was lower than the adjusted three-
month and nine-month rates (2.74 per cent and 2.73 per cent). This dip in the spot yield curve
could be a result of the actual term premium for six-month yields (or the front BAX contract)
being smaller than the estimated value that is used in the model.
The regressions performed in the previous sections showed that the term premium values have
been relatively stable over time for the shorter-term assets. The one-month BA term premium was
4 basis points with a standard error of only 0.5 basis points, and the three-month BA term
premium was 10.6 basis points with a standard error of 1.3 basis points. BAX contracts, however,
had a relatively wider conﬁdence band for their term premium estimates. For the front BAX
contract, the term premium (in basis points) was estimated as 0.11 multiplied by the number of
days to settlement, or approximately 10 basis points relative to the three-month BA in the
17 December example. The standard error of this coefﬁcient, however, is 0.07. This gives a range
of 3.6 to 16.2 basis points. As with any model, some judgment needs to be exercised, particularly
when looking at expectations beyond the next couple of FADs. It is important to use other43
instruments (such as the OIS market), as well as some of the more qualitative measures, as a
check to support the results obtained from the implied-forward-rate model.
7. Conclusions
One of the primary methods currently used by the Bank to quantify market expectations for future
changes in the overnight rate is to use an expectations-based model to derive implied forward
rates. These implied forward rates are interpreted as the market’s expectations for the future levels
of short-term interest rates, and can provide both a point estimate and an implied probability of a
future change.
The use of an expectations-based model assumes that the EH provides an accurate representation
of the behaviour of money market yields in Canada. The results of this analysis show that, since
FADs have been implemented at the Bank, the EH cannot be rejected for a number of short-term
assets. BAs, in particular, show both a high degree of explanatory power and relatively small and
stable risk premiums for all maturity tranches. As a result, one- and three-month BAs were
selected as the primary input into the expectations model. The results for BAX futures contracts
are not as robust as those for the BAs, reﬂecting their longer time-to-maturity and the increasing
impact of expectational errors. Nonetheless, the results are strong enough to warrant their
inclusion in the model.
The results of this analysis also show that the implementation of the FAD regime coincided with a
signiﬁcant improvement in the explanatory power of the various short-term assets examined. It
was only in the post-FAD regime that the EH appeared to hold for the one- and three-month
assets. Although no causality has been proven, it is possible that the generally higher level of
transparency and reduced uncertainty surrounding the timing of changes in the overnight rate in
the post-FAD period have reduced expectational errors in the pricing of money market assets.
This inability to reject the EH for short time horizons is consistent with some of the more recent
work conducted by both the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and provides
empirical justiﬁcation for the use of an expectations-based model to derive market expectations.44
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